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Finally one must conclude that despite its legislative history, the
courts will not look upon the New York statute as evidence of a
strong state policy against all governmental intrusions into the workings
of the free press. This conclusion is demonstrated by the explicit re-
fusal of the majority in Proskin to construe the statute liberally and
also by their refusal to require the district attorney to show anything
more than that he desired the letter to investigate a serious crime. Thus
if these lower court decisions are sustained by the New York Court of
Appeals, there will be little protection for newsmen outside the in-
creasingly narrow scope of the statute.
ROBERT L. NISELY
FAMILY LAW-A MAN WHO CONSENTS TO THE HETEROLOGOUS
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION OF His WIFE Is THE CHILD'S FATHER WHOSE
PERMISSION IS REQUIRED FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE CHILD BY ANOTHER.
During the marriage of W and H a child, conceived by artificial
insemination, was born. H, who had full knowledge of the procedure
and who had given his consent, was listed on the birth certificate as
the child's father. The couple separated and were subsequently di-
vorced; both the separation agreement and the divorce decree declared
the child to be the daughter of W and H. The husband complied with
all provisions of the divorce decree and retained visitation rights. The
wife remarried and her new husband, H' (petitioner in this case),
sought to adopt the child of the wife's first marriage.
Under the New York Domestic Relations Law, if a child is desig-
nated as born "in wedlock," both "parents" must consent to the adop-
tion.' Upon H's refusal to consent, petitioner instituted adoption pro-
ceedings in the Surrogate's Court of Kings County, claiming that H's
1. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1964).
Subject to the limitations hereinafter set forth consent to adoption shall
be required as follows:
2. Of the parents or surviving parent, whether adult or infant, of a
child born in wedlock;




0nsent was not necessary. Petitioner contends that H is not the "par-
ent" of the child within the meaning of the statute, in light of the
circumstances surrounding the child's conception. The surrogate's
court dismissed the petition. Held: a child born of consensual heter-
ologous artificial insemination during a valid marriage is a legitimate
child entitled to the rights and privileges of a naturally conceived child
of the same marriage; the father of such child is therefore the "parent"
whose consent is a prerequisite to the adoption of such child by an-
other. In re Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d
430 (Sur. Ct. 1973).
Consensual artificial insemination by a donor (AID) is a volun-
tary medical technique used to achieve human conception. Its use to
overcome problems of male infertility and communicability of heredi-
tary defects2 is of relatively recent origin 3 and remains unregulated in
most municipalities of New York State.4 Technically known as heter-
ologous insemination, the process involves placing the spermatozoa of a
usually anonymous donor into the reproductive organs of the female
where it can then fertilize the ovum.6 If the spermatozoa of the husband
is used, the procedure is called artificial insemination by husband
(AIH). AIH involves no legal questions, since the child is considered
the natural child of the couple.7 There is also a variation of the tech-
nique in which semen from the husband is added to semen of the
donor so that if conception occurs it cannot be said conclusively that
the resulting child is not biologically a product of the husband
2. See Kindregan, State Power over Human Fertility and Individual Liberty, 23
HASTINGS L.J. 1401, 1409 (1972).
3. See, e.g., Note, Artificial Insemination and the Law, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 203, 204.
4. Contra, NEW YORK CITY HEALTH CODE § 112, cited in E. BISKIND, BOARD-
MAN'S NEW YORK FAMILY LAW § 117, at 533 (1972).
Artificial Human Insemination.-No person other than a physician duly
licensed to practice medicine in the State of New York shall collect, offer
for sale, sell or give away human seminal fluid for the purpose of causing
artificial insemination in a human being or except in accordance with the
regulations of the Board of Health of the Department of Health of the City
of New York.
Id. See also NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF HEALTH REGULATIONS, cited in E. BISKIND,
supra, at 533-34.
5. "[T]here would appear to be no reason why the donor should not be known to
or indeed selected by the recipient, if the latter preferred it that way and the donor
was agreeable." MacLennan v. MacLennan, [1958] Scots L.T.R. 12, 14.
6. Kindregan, supra note 2, at 1408.
7. In re Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99, 100, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430, 431 (Sur.
Ct. 1973) [hereinafter cited as instant case]. See also Sagall, Artificial Insemination,
TRIAL, Jan.-Feb., 1973, at 59.
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(AIHD) .s It should be stressed that artificial insemination does not in-
volve sexual intercourse with the donor.
Despite its relative simplicity as a medical procedure,9 artificial in-
semination raises profound social problems. Some organized religious
groups have opposed its use. Although there is neither an official
Protestant nor Jewish position on the subject, the Catholic position is
one of categorical opposition. 0
There are many legal problems and questions of public policy sur-
rounding the use of artificial insemination." One legal issue the courts
have been forced to confront is whether a woman who submits to the
procedure can be charged with adultery; on this the courts have split.
Dicta in the pioneer case of Orford v. Orford,2 in which AID was
performed without the consent of the husband, declared that the proce-
dure constituted adultery. A superior court in Illinois followed the
Orford rationale by holding that the act, even though consented to by
the husband, is adulterous. 1 A Scottish decision, however, reflects a
contrary view.14 In People v. Sorensen,"' a California case generally
cited for its holding on the legitimacy of the consensual AID child
as well as its statements on adultery, a man medically determined to
be sterile agreed to permit his wife to be artificially inseminated. Upon
separation and divorce in 1964, Mrs. Sorensen obtained custody of the
child but did not request support for it. Because of an illness in 1966,
she was forced to receive public assistance under the California Aid to
Needy Children Program. An action was then brought by the District
Attorney of Sonoma County, California, alleging that the defendant,
Mr. Sorensen, was guilty of violating a state penal statute1" which
8. Sagall, supra note 7, at 59.
9. Id. at 60.
10. "The Catholic position is that it is morally wrong under any circumstances to
impregnate a woman either with the semen of a man not her husband or with the
semen of her husband gathered outside the natural sex act." Comment, The Legal Conse-
quences of Artificial Insemination in New York, 19 SYRAcuSE L. REv. 1009, 1011 (1968).
11. Sagall, supra note 7, at 59.
12. [1921] 58 D.L.R. 251.
13. Doornbos v. Doornbos, No. 54-S-14891 (Ill. Super. Ct., Dec. 13, 1954),
appeal dismissed on procedural grounds, 12 Ill. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956).
14. MacLennan v. MacLennan, [1958] Scots L.T.R. 12.
15. 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968).
16. CAL. PENAL LAW § 270 (West 1970).
A father of either a legitimate or illegitimate minor child who willfully
omits without lawful excuse to furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter or
medical attendance or other remedial care for his child is guilty of a misde-
meanor and punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000)
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imposed upon him an obligation to support. The defendant was con-
victed. In its affirmance, the California Supreme Court defined adultery
as necessarily involving sexual intercourse and articulated the modern
position on the subject:
Since the doctor may be a woman, or the husband himself may ad-
minister the insemination by a syringe, this is patently absurd; to con-
sider it an act of adultery with the donor, who at the time of insemi-
nation may be a thousand miles away or may even be dead, is equally
absurd.17
The consequences of artificial insemination and subsequent live
birth create another major legal problem: the legitimacy of a child
conceived by means of AID and born to a married woman and her con-
senting husband.'8 Two of the three major cases that discuss the ques-
tion have held that such a child is legitimate issue. Strnad v. Strnad0
was a custody proceeding which resulted in the awarding of the child
to the mother. However, since the husband was not shown to be an
unfit guardian, and notwithstanding the fact that the child was con-
ceived by consensual AID, the court held that the best interest of the
minor child called for visitation by the husband. The court indirectly
declared such a child to be legitimate, stating that
logically and realistically, the situation is no different than [sic] that
pertaining in the case of a child born out of wedlock who by law is
made legitimate upon the marriage of the interested parties."
or by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such
fine and imprisonment. .... This statute shall not be construed so as to re-
lieve such father from the criminal liability defined herein for such omission
merely because the mother of such child is legally entitled to the custody of such
child nor because the mother of such child, or any other person, or organiza-
tion, voluntarily or involuntarily furnishes such necessary food, clothing,
shelter or medical attendance or other remedial care for such child, or under-
takes to do so.
The provisions of this section are applicable whether the parents of such
child are married or divorced, and regardless of any decree made in any divorce
action relative to alimony or to the support of the child ....
Id.
17. People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 289, 437 P.2d 495, 501, 66 Cal. Rptr.
7, 13 (1968).
18. Biskind, Legitimacy of a Child Born by Artificial Insemination, 5 J. FAMILY L.
39 (1965). See generally Smith, Artificial Insemination-No Longer a Quagmire, 3
FAmIY L.Q. 1 (1969).
19. 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
20. Id. at 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
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However, another New York court has ruled to the contrary. In
1963 the question of a consensual AID child's legitimacy was raised
during the course of an annulment proceeding in Gursky v. Gursky.2'
The issue was whether the husband had an obligation to support the
consensual AID child. In holding the child illegitimate, the court em-
phasized that
[t]he concept ... historically is deeply imbedded in the law .. that
a child who is begotten through a father who is not the mother's
husband is deemed to be illegitimate.
2z
Moreover, the court reasoned that the legislature's failure to pass statutes
which would render legitimate those children conceived through arti-
ficial insemination, while at the same time modifying concepts of legiti-
macy in other areas, 23 must be deemed a manifestation of the legisla-
ture's disinclination to alter the logical results of illegitimacy in such
cases.
Perhaps the most enlightened discussion of the legitimacy issue is
in Sorensen.24 There, the California Supreme Court stated that the
public policy of California favors legitimation and no public purpose
would be served by stigmatizing such a consensual AID child as illegiti-
mate:
[A] reasonable man who, because of his inability to procreate, actively
participates and consents to his wife's artificial insemination in the
hope that a child will be produced whom they will treat as their
own, knows that such behavior carries with it the legal responsi-
bilities of fatherhood and criminal responsibility for nonsupport.25
In holding that a consensual AID child is legitimate, the court stated
that legitimacy is a legal status which may exist despite the fact that the
husband is not the natural father of the child.
Cases dealing with the issue of the legitimacy of consensual AID
children are implicity grounded on the doctrine of the presumption of
legitimacy. In cases in which paternity is at issue there is a presumption
21. 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
22. Id. at 1085, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
23. See generally N.Y. Domx. REL. LAW §§ 24, 145 (McKinney 1964), as amended,
N.Y. Domt. REL. LAw § 24 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
24. For a discussion of the facts of the case, see text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
25. People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 285, 437 P.2d 495, 499, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7,
11 (1968).
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that the husband is the father of the child.2 6 In most states it is a re-
buttable presumption; thus the burden of persuasion is placed on the
party arguing illegitimacy.27 Authorities are in dispute as to the type of
evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption; two standards frequently
,employed are that the presumption may be rebutted, (1) by evidence
.which is clear and convincing, or (2) only by evidence which shows
beyond a reasonable doubt that.the husband could not have been the
child's father. Evidence of the husband's impotency or sterility, evi-
dence that husband and wife were not living together under circum-
stances in which sexual intercourse was possible (non-access), and
blood grouping tests are examples of the types of evidence which have
been held sufficient to rebut the presumption.2 8
Reasons offered for the presumption of legitimacy include the law's
desire to make amends for its shabby treatment of illegitimate chil-
dren generally 9 and its interest in stabilizing family relationships."
The trend towards narrowing rather than enlarging the area in which
children are labeled illegitimate31 evidences a recognition of the stigma-
tizing effect of bastardization.
The same barriers that are erected to prevent a naturally con-
ceived child from being bastardized are not relevant to the question
of the legitimacy of a consensual AID child. It is likely that the hus-
band agreed to his wife's artificial insemination precisely because of
the existence of factors-impotency, sterility, Rh blood factor-that
would constitute sufficient evidence to rebut the legitimacy presump-
tion. The husband's consent combined with the fact that the donor's
identity is kept secret and that the doctor's knowledge and records are
not open to discovery3 2 operate as barriers to proving illegitimacy of
26. See H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 15-17 (1971).
,27. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 172 n.96 (1968). But see H. KRAUSE,
supra note 26, at 16. Several states continue to employ a conclusive presumption which
upholds the child's legitimacy even when non-paternity can be established absolutely.
28. H. CLARK, supra note 27, at 172-73.
29. Id. at 172 n.96.
30. H. KRAUSE, supra note 26, at 15.
31. There have been several recent cases dealing with the rights of illegitimate
children in relation to support, inheritance, rights in wrongful death actions, etc. which
have been argued on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532
(1971); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Storm v. None, 57 Misc. 2d 342, 291 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Farn.
Ct. 1968). See Biskind, supra note 18, at 43.
32. Doctors' records are not open to discovery to protect the donor. Even so, it
is doubtful that a court would find the donor, rather than the husband who consented to
the AID, liable for the child's support. See generally Note, supra note 3, at 209-10.
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a consensual AID child. Perhaps the only evidence that might be sufli-
cient to establish an AID child's illegitimacy is that of the husband's
failure effectively to consent.
The same policy considerations which are against stigmatizing a
naturally conceived child by branding him illegitimate underlie the
desire to avoid bastardizing a child conceived by consensual AID. The
policy is strengthened by the existence of the estoppel doctrine.
When a husband consents to the artificial insemination of his wife
because of his own physical or psychological sexual inadequacies but
permits his name to be listed on the birth certificate as the father,
it would seem that a presumption of legitimacy born of the recog-
nition that it is necessary to remove from children the stigma of
illegitimacy, should operate as an estoppel against both a wife and
husband contravening or contradicting his parenthood.33
Should a couple wish to ensure the legitimacy of a child conceived by
artificial insemination without relying on the estoppel doctrine, it can
institute statutory adoption proceedings. This is seldom done, how-
ever, "because the parents wish to avoid even the limited notoriety
entailed by adoption."34
Only a handful of state legislatures have had the foresight to enact
statutes which would eliminate the necessity of judicial determinations
on the subject of the legitimacy of consensual AID children. Okla-
homa,35 Kansas,36 and Georgia 1 have enacted the most comprehen-
33. Biskind, supra note 18, at 43. See also E. BISXIND, BOARDMAN'S NaW YORK
FAMILY LAw § 117, at 536 (1972).
34. H. CLARK, supra note 27, at 157 n.28 (1968).
35. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 551-52 (Supp. 1972).
§ 551. The technique of heterologous artificial insemination may be per-
formed in this State by persons duly authorized to practice medicine at the re-
quest and with the consent in writing of the husband and wife desiring the
utilization of such technique for the purpose of conceiving a child or children.
§ 552. Any child or children born as the result thereof shall be considered
at law in all respects the same as a naturally conceived legitimate child of the
husband and wife so requesting and consenting to the use of such technique.Id.
36. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-129 (Supp. 1968).
Any child or children heretofore or hereafter born as the result of heter-
ologous artificial insemination shall be considered at law in all respects the same
as a naturally conceived child of the husband and wife so requesting and con-
senting to the use of such technique.
Id.
37. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-101.1(1) (Supp. 1969).
All children born within wedlock, or within the usual period of gestation
thereafter, who have been conceived by the means of artificial insemination, are
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sive provisions. Under these statutes an AID child born to consenting
parents during the course of the marriage is declared legitimate for all
purposes. In these states the doctor is not criminally liable and the
mother is not an adulteress. Arizona's law38 that children born out of
wedlock are deemed to be legitimate would cover AID children should
Arizona courts choose to declare that their birth is out of wedlock.
In analyzing the rationale of the instant case, it is helpful to ap-
proach the matter as did the court, both examining the public policy
issues and considering whether the very few cases dealing with the
subject of the legal status of a consensual AID child are persuasive
authority.
The court relies principally upon Sorensen to reach its holding of
legitimacy, not only because it is the most recent decision but also
because it is the only reported decision of an appellate court.3 9 The
California Supreme Court held that the defendant in Sorensen was
the lawful father of a dependent child born of consensual AID and that
the term "father" as used in the penal statute was not limited to a bio-
logical or natural father. The court in the instant case quotes approv-
ingly that portion of the Sorensen opinion which sets forth the doc-
trine of equitable estoppel. The operating principle is that a man who
actively participates in his wife's decision to undergo the artificial in-
semination procedure in the hope that a child will be born-a child
whom he expects to nurture as his own-is estopped from disclaiming
responsibility toward that child. The surrogate's court quotes a sen-
tence from Sorensen that has a direct bearing on the issue in the in-
stant case:
Nor are we persuaded that the concept of legitimacy demands that
the child be the actual offspring of the husband of the mother and if
semen of some other male is utilized the resulting child is illegitimate.40
The court focuses on Sorensen's resolution of the illegitimacy question
because petitioner here argues that the child of his wife's first marriage
is illegitimate. If the court had agreed with petitioner and accepted the
irrebuttably presumed legitimate if both the husband and wife consent in writ-
ing to the use and administration of artificial insemination.
Id.
38. ARIz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 14-206 (1956).
39. For a discussion of the facts of the case, see text accompanying notes 15-17
supTa.
40. Instant case at 103, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 433-34.
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doctrine that the father of an illegitimate child has no standing to ob-
ject to adoption by the husband of the natural mother,41 petitioner
would have been successful in his efforts to adopt the child.
The surrogate's court proceeds to examine Gursky v. Gursky,'
2
the leading New York case on the subject. In light of the fact that the
much-criticized Gursky decision is the only published opinion which
flatly holds that consensual AID children are illegitimate, the court
declares it not to be persuasive. The surrogate's court deigns not to
follow Gursky because the definition of an illegitimate child upon
which that case relied was developed long before the advent of artifi-
cial insemination. 43 The fact that the New York legislature has not
yet enacted a statute concerning artificial insemination is not neces-
sarily indicative of a belief on the part of the legislature that courts
should decline to rule on the issue. The court suggested that the failure
of the legislature to enact any new measure may be rationalized on the
ground that the judiciary can reach an acceptable solution.
44
Because of the scarcity of decisional law, 45 the court turns to pub-
lic policy considerations in attempting to reach a decision. It considers
New York's statutory presumption in favor of legitimacy as stated in
section 24 of the Domestic Relations Law. 46 Under that statute a child
born of a void or voidable marriage, even when the marriage is de-
liberately and knowingly bigamous, incestuous or adulterous, is legiti-
mate and is entitled to all the rights of a child born of a perfectly
valid marriage. The legislature's strengthening of the existing statute
in 1969 is evidence of its strong disfavor of bastardizing the issue of
any marriage.47
41. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Brousal, 66 Misc. 2d 711, 322 N.Y.S.2d 28 (Sur.
Ct. 1971).
42. For a discussion of the case, see text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
43. Instant case at 104, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
44. Id., 345 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
45. For a discussion of People v. Sorensen and Gursky v. Gursky, see text ac-
companying notes 15-17, 21-22 supra.
46. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 24(1) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
A child heretofore or hereafter born of parents who prior or subsequent
to the birth of such child shall have entered into a civil or religious marriage,
or shall have consummated a common-law marriage where such marriage is
recognized as valid ... is the legitimate child of both natural parents notwith-
standing that such marriage is void or voidable or has been or shall hereafter
be annulled or judicially declared void..
Id.
47. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 24(1) (McKinney Supp. 1973). See also REPoRT or
LAw RFvsoN CoMMISSION, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65C (1969).
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In reaching its determination that public policy favors legitimacy
of consensual AID children, the court notes that the policy objections
against bigamous, incestuous, and adulterous relationships have not
prevented the legitimation of the issue of such relationships. There is
far less reason, in light of the non-adulterous circumstances surround-
ing the child's conception and birth, to stigmatize the consensual AID
child, even though there exist moral and religious objections to artifi-
cial insemination.
48
In re Adoption of Anonymous is the first case squarely to confront
the issue of the legitimacy of the consensual AID child; previously cited
decisions dealt with the issue only as it necessarily had to be faced to
decide questions such as support or visitation rights. A finding of
legitimacy or illegitimacy in the instant case was dispositive of the
issue of whether petitioner could adopt the child without the consent
of the first husband. A finding of illegitimacy in Gursky, by contrast,
would not have been so conclusive, since all children, illegitimate as
well as legitimate, are entitled to support from those responsible for
their birth.49
Contributing to the opinion's persuasiveness is the fact that, al-
though the court is cognizant of the moral arguments attending artifi-
cial insemination, it does not digress from the legal issue which it must
decide-that of legitimacy.
One might well question how the contrary finding of illegitimacy
could have been supported when the clear intent of the parties in under-
going the procedure was to give birth to their own "legitimate" child.
No valid purpose would be served by a state policy that would compel
a man who is assuming the paternal role in administering love, sup-
port, guidance, and care to expend the time and money to adopt a
child he considers his own.
It would have been instructive had the opinion indicated whether
the existence of section 112 of the New York City Health Code50 had
any bearing on the surrogate's court's decision. It is unclear whether
the court neglected to mention the issue of the doctor's liability because
the doctor who treated the wife came within the purview of the Health
48. Instant case at 105, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
49. In Gursky v. Gursky the responsibility was based on consent to the artificial
insemination which the husband was estopped from, denying. See generally H. KRA s,
supra note 26, at 22-25.
50. See NEWv YORK CITY HEALTH CODE § 112, in E. BISKIND, BOARDMAN'S NEW
YORI FAILY LAw § 117, at 533 (1972).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Code or because criminal liability of the doctor would have no effect
on the legal status of a consensual AID child. One also wonders whether
the failure even to mention the possible adultery of the wife results
from the apparent absurdity of such a charge or because the Health
Code obviates the issue.
It may be speculated that the collateral effects of the decision will
occur in the areas of "reliance," parent-child relationship, intestacy suc-
cession, and future legislation.
Despite its noteworthiness in forthrightly addressing the legiti-
macy issue, the instant case will not have the impact of a court of ap-
peals ruling.5' Yet Gursky is itself only a trial court decision, as is
Strnad. We now live in a period in which enlightened attitudes toward
human reproduction are more prevalent.5 2 In light of this, the instant
case could support a move in New York to ensure the legitimacy of
consensual AID children. If the court of appeals is ever called upon to
decide the issue, it will most likely confer approval on such a trend.
One factor which will weigh heavily in such a decision is the reli-
ance New Yorkers have placed upon lower court decisions when choos-
ing to utilize artificial insemination .5 3 Support for the proposition that
such a consideration is important can be found in the action of the
court of appeals in recognizing bilateral Mexican divorces. In Rosen-
stiel v. Rosenstie 54 the court of appeals stated that
[i]n the background of this problem is a long series of decisions over
a period of a quarter of a century in the New York Supreme Court
at Appellate Division and at Special Term recognizing the validity
of bilateral Mexican divorces which we consider has some relevancy
to the question before us.
5
51. In a telephone conversation of October 2, 1973 with Anthony E. Maglio, at-
torney for petitioner, counsel indicated that petitioner would not appeal from the dis-
missal of the adoption petition.
52. There has been judicial as well as statutory sanction of abortion on demand
with certain limitations. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973); N.Y. PENAL LAw
§ 125.05(3) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
3. "Justifiable Abortional Act." An abortional act is justifiable when com-
mitted upon a female with her consent by a duly licensed physician acting (a)
under a reasonable belief that such is necessary to preserve her life, or (b)
within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy ....
Id.
53. Some authorities estimate that as of 1968 there were 5000-7000 births in the
United States as a result of artificial insemination. See generally Note, supra note 3, at
205 nn.16-17.
54. 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965).
55. Id. at 71, 209 N.E.2d at 710-11, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (emphasis added),
558
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The second major area in which the decision may have an effect
is in the parent-child relationship. Specifically, a legitimacy holding may
be interpreted as promoting the psychological welfare of the consensual
AID child in question, facilitating the paternal role of the man who
consented to the child's conception, and fostering nuclear family
solidarity.
Authorities agree that an awareness of his own illegitimacy can
have a deleterious effect on a child's self-image. 56 The importance of
early parent-child interaction as a factor in the emotional development
of the individual has long been recognized.57 This fact becomes espe-
cially significant when combined with the argument that the law pro-
vides few safeguards to protect the child's psychological well-being.5s
Freud-Goldstein-Solnit call the adult who provides day-to-day af-
fection and stimulation "the psychological parent," and they insist
that a child's relationship with his psychological parent, whether or
not he or she is the child's natural parent, should never be inter-
rupted.59
The child's psychological parent is the person to whom the child is
related by memories, from whom he learns through identification, and
with whom he is connected by daily experiences.
In the instant case it is likely that the father, who wanted this
child, who spent time with her during her crucial formative years, and
from whom she acquired some of her sense of identity, would have
been deprived of seeing his "own" child had she been adopted by peti-
tioner. By declaring the child legitimate, the child's psychological
father, H (in the case of artificial insemination there is really no "nat-
ural" father6 ), may continue to see her and to exercise some degree
of paternal control over her. Yet, petitioner would still have the op-
portunity to be with his wife's daughter and aid in her socialization.
56. H. KRAUSE, supra note 26, at 263 n.14.
57. L. BROOM & P. SELZNICK, SOCIOLOGY 99 (4th ed. 1968).
58. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD (1973) (discussed in Kramer, The "Psychological Parent" is the Real Par-
ent, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1973, § 6 (Magazine), at 70).
59. Kramer, The "Psychological Parent" is the Real Parent, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7,
1973, § 6 (Magazine), at 70.
60. People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 284, 437 P.2d 495, 498, 66 Cal. Rptr.
7,1 0 (1968).
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The psychological parent concept is better suited to the nuclear
family situation where mother, father, and consensual AID child, all
live together without the problem of divorce. Nuclear family solidarity
is fostered by a judicial declaration that the man who is the psycholog-
ical father is also the legal father. Thus, the family unit need not be
disrupted by legal problems of the "father's" being required to adopt
his own child. The unit of mother, father, and AID child becomes in-
distinguishable from natural family units. This is essentially the goal
of artificial insemination-to enable those who cannot conceive their
own families to become parents.
Holding consensual AID children to be legitimate may have an
impact on intestate succession, as it would seem to permit a consensual
AID child to inherit"' from his father without the father having to
file an order of filiation.62
The decision in the instant case may generate a legislative response
to the problem of AID children. In light of the increased use of the
medical technique, more courts will be faced with the legitimacy issue
in cases involving adoption, visitation rights, support, inheritance, and
especially in cases where husbands, having given their consent, try to
deny their support obligations. Statewide legislation, perhaps similar
to the Oklahoma or Kansas enactments, would eliminate all incon-
sistency that might result from numerous and conflicting trial court
decisions, in the absence of a court of appeals pronouncement. Such
legislation should also clarify the potential liability of doctors who
employ AID in their practices.
61. Illegitimacy status originally only affected one's property rights. See, e.g., Bis-
kind, supra note 18, at 43.
62. N.Y. EST., Pow. & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(a)(1)-(3) (McKinney 1967).
(a) For the purpose of this article:
(1) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his mother so that he and
his issue inherit from his mother and from his maternal kindred.
(2) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and
his issue inherit from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has, during
the lifetime of the father, made an order of filiation declaring paternity in a
proceeding instituted during the pregnancy of the mother or within two years
from the birth of the child.
(3) The existence of an agreement obligating the father to support the
illegitimate child does not qualify such child or his issue to inherit from the





Despite the fact that the instant case involves a consenting hus-
band, the holding raises the question of whether a court would legiti-
mate a child conceived by artificial insemination conducted without
the husband's consent.6 3 Possible alternatives range from holding the
child legitimate for all purposes to a finding of absolute illegitimacy.
There is also the possibility that a court might deem such a child
"quasi-legitimate"-i.e., the husband would be obliged to support the
child but the child would be prohibited from being an intestate suc-
cessor to the "father's" estate. A judicial declaration of the non-con-
sensual AID child's legitimacy would serve the same positive purpose
of avoiding the negative effects of bastardization as does the holding
that consensual AID children are legitimate. However, the "legitimate-
for-all-purposes" solution raises additional problems. Perhaps a woman
who had committed adultery and had become pregnant by another
man might attempt, improperly, to explain the child as being the
result of non-consensual artificial insemination. The possibilities for
marital disruption here are numerous. On the other hand, holding the
child conceived by non-consensual AID illegitimate is extreme in that
it operates as a punishment to both the child and its mother.
Perhaps the most rational position is the middle course of holding
the non-consensual AID child legitimate for purposes that immediately
affect its life (support and the positive psychological effect of a father's
surname) but not for the purposes of inheritance. The statutory and
judicial trend away from bastardization suggests that even the non-
consensual AID child should be permitted a name. Whether the hus-
band must support the child should be based on a balancing test: one
must weigh the desire of having the husband support a child to whose
conception he did not consent against the possibility of its becoming
a public charge. Surely the state would prefer the former alternative.
Because of the thorny issues examined above, it is desirable that any
statutory enactment on artificial insemination speak specifically to the
point of the legitimacy of non-consensual AID children.
For the court in In re Adoption of Anonymous to have given cre-
dence to the poorly articulated opinion in Gursky that an AID child
is illegitimate would have been to turn its back on the interests of the
child, the family, and the medical profession. In view of the enlightened
attitude shown by the surrogate's court, the legal future for AID chil-
63. See generally Note, supra note 3, at 219-23.
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dren appears bright. "The testing agents for resolving this area of
critical legal dubitation are common sense and moral decency."0 4
BARBARA J. DAviEs
64. Smith, For Unto Us a Child is Born-Legally, 56 A.B.A.J. 143, 145 (1970).
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